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Blood sample taken without defendant's consent during a prearrest investigation is inadmissible in subsequent prosecution unless taken pursuant to an authorizing court order
The United States Supreme Court has declared that the nonconsensual taking of a blood sample from a defendant, upon findings of probable cause and exigency, is constitutionally permissible. 20 1 This has resulted in more effective state prosecution of
alcohol-related crimes, 20 2 since evidence of blood-alcohol content
sion stated that in order to obtain a bload sample from a suspect, a formal charge must have
been filed against him. 81 App. Div. 2d at 369, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 93. The court reasoned that
"[i]f the police have probable cause to arrest, they should effect the arrest. However, if this
is lacking, then the individual should be free from the intrusion' which the People seek to
impose upon him." Id. Similarly in In re Mackell v. Palermo, 59 Misc. 2d 760, 300 N.Y.S.2d
459 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969), the court, in denying an application by the District
Attorney to have a suspect shave his beard for identification purposes, noted that "the rub
here, and the reason compelling a denial of the District Attorney's application, is that the
respondent, whose facial hair is sought to be removed, is not a defendant in any proceeding
in this county." Id. at 765, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (emphasis in original); cf. People v. Moselle,
57 N.Y.2d 97, 109, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292, 297 (1982) (CPL § 240.40 has
preempted authorization and regulation of the taking of blood samples).
201 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). In Schmerber, the defendantdriver was involved in an automobile accident. Id. at 758. The defendant was arrested after
the police detected the odor of alcohol on his presence. Id. Subsequently, the arresting
officer directed a physician to take a sample of defendant's blood, although the defendant
refused, on the advice of counsel, to consent to the tests. Id. at 758-59. The sample ultimately revealed a blood-alcohol content (BAC) in excess of the legal intoxication level in
California. Id. at 759. The defendant was convicted of driving an automobile under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that he was subjected to an
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 758-59. The
Court held that the taking of a blood sample is a search and seizure covered by the fourth
amendment, id. at 767, and stated that a warrant normally would be necessary to justify
this type of bodily intrusion, id. at 770. The Court nevertheless held that:
The officer.., might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with
an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened "the destruction of evidence,". . ..[Tihe percentage of alco-"
hol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the
scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a
warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content . . . was an appropriate incident to petitioner's
arrest.
Id. at 770-71; see P. WESTON & K. WELLS, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE FOR POLICE 174-75 (2d ed.
1976).
202 See, e.g., Delarosa v. State, 384 So.2d 876, 878 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (prosecutor
need only introduce evidence of defendant's BAC and produce expert testimony that driver
was impaired); Palmer v. State, 604 P.2d 1106, 1109 & n.6 (Alaska 1979) (statutory presumption based on BAC); People v. Meyers, 198 Colo. 295, 298, 599 P.2d 891, 892 (1979)
(prosecutor need only introduce evidence of BAC and expert testimony); Commonwealth v.
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(BAC), when admissible, is difficult to overcome. 0 3 Although the
New York Court of Appeals, in In re Abe A.,204 condoned the
prearrest, compelled extraction of blood pursuant to a court order,205 nonetheless, an uncertainty exists as to what extent a court

order is required to obtain such evidence. Recently, in People v.
Moselle,0 6 the Court of Appeals held that a court order must issue
prior to the nonconsensual taking of a blood sample during a
prearrest investigation that ultimately leads to a prosecution under
the Penal Law.207
This appeal involved three cases consolidated for argument,
two of which are relevant to this discussion.20 8 In People v.
Guiliano, 274 Pa. Super. 419, 425, 418 A.2d 476, 479 (1980) (statutory presumption based on
BAC).
203 See L. TAYLOR, DRUNK DR1VNG DEFENSE 314-20 (1981) (blood sample analysis "is
the most accurate of the three common procedures, leaving the least room for crossexamination").
The necessity for an accurate method of measuring BAC is clear. Surveys have revealed that of the 100 million drivers in the United States, 7 million are problem drinkers.
This means that at any given time, 1 in 50 drivers has a BAC that exceeds the legal limit.
30,000 of the 55,000 traffic fatalities per year are alcohol related. See B. LANDSTREET, THE
DRINKING DRIVER 4 (1977). In New York State, there has been a sharp increase in alcoholrelated traffic deaths. In 1979, there were 535 alcohol-related traffic fatalities. In 1980, the
fatalities figure rose to 737, and, in the following year, 979 such deaths occurred. People v.
Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 115, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 1243, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292, 300 (1982) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting).
20 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982).
205 Id. at 291, 437 N.E.2d at 266, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 7; see infra note 237 and accompanying text.
257 N.Y.2d 97,-439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982).
2-Id. at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. The Court prefaced its opinion
by recognizing that "blood samples taken without a defendant's consent are inadmissible in
prosecutions under the Penal Law unless taken pursuant to an authorizing court order." Id.
208 The third case, People v. Moselle, concerns a separate issue which will not be discussed in depth. In Moselle, the motor vehicle that the defendant was operating collided
with another car, killing its driver. Id. A police officer at the hospital noticed the odor of
alcohol emanating from the defendant, and without getting the defendant's consent, directed a physician to take a blood sample from the defendant. Id. The blood sample subsequently revealed a BAC of .17 of 1% by weight. Id. at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d
at 293. The defendant later was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a BAC in
excess of .10 of 1%. Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TRm. LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1970). He was not
charged under the Penal Law. 57 N.Y.2d at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
The issue in the case was whether the above-mentioned procedure complied with the New
York implied consent statute, N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 1194 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1982-1983), which relates to the taking of blood samples when the defendant has "been
placed under arrest or after a breath test indicates the presence of alcohol in his system." 57
N.Y.2d at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW § 1194
(McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983). The Court held that the statute was not complied
with, and thus, suppressed the evidence derived from the blood sample. 57 N.Y.2d at 107,

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:805

Daniel,209 the van that the defendant was driving collided with two
cars, resulting in the death of a passenger of one of the
automobiles.2 10 The police found evidence of alcoholic beverages in

the defendant's van. 211 Approximately 1 hour after the accident, a
police officer directed a physician to extract a blood sample from
the defendant.21 2 Subsequent analysis revealed a BAC of .22 of 1%
by weight.21 s Based upon this evidence, the defendant was indicted
for driving while intoxicated 214 and for criminally negligent homicide. 21 5 The defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the evidence

relating to the blood sample was granted by the Supreme Court,
Erie County,216 and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
affirmed that order on appeal. 1 7
In People v. Wolter,21 8 the automobile driven by the defen-

dant struck another vehicle head on, resulting in the death of the
439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296.
9 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982), aff'g, 84 App. Div. 2d 916,
446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dep't 1981).
210 57 N.Y.2d at 102-03, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
Id. at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. The police officer at the scene of
the accident observed a half-full bottle of cold beer on the console of the defendant's van
and two empty beer bottles on the dashboard and on the floor. Id.
212 84 App. Div. 2d at 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 659. The defendant was neither arrested at
the time the blood test was administered, nor asked whether he would consent to the taking
of a blood sample. 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
213 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. It is unlawful for a
person to operate a motor vehicle while he has .10 of 1% or more by weight of alcohol in his
blood. See N.Y. VEH. & Ta p. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 1970). A BAC of .05 of 1% or less
is prima facie evidence that the person's ability to drive a motor vehicle has not been impaired. Id. § 1195(2)(a). A BAC between .05 and .07 of 1% is relevant evidence that the
individual was driving while impaired. Id. § 1195(2)(b). A BAC between .07 and .10 is prima
facie evidence that the person's driving was impaired by alcohol. Id. § 1195(2)(b).
21- 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294; see N.Y. VE. & TRAP.
LAW § 1192(2) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
22.57 N.Y. 2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S. 2d at 294, see N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.10 (McKinney 1970).
21057 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
21 84 App. Div. 2d at 917, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60. It should be noted that the rationale
used by the appellate division to support its affirmance was based upon its finding that
section 1195(1) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (dealing with admissibility of blood samples
under the Vehicle and Traffic Law) mandated the application of dection 1194, concerning
requirements for blood tests, such as probable cause and time limits for the taking of blood
samples, to prosecutions under the Penal Law, as well as under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1194, 1195(1) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983). The
Court of Appeals rejected this rationale. 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d
at 296.
218 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982), aft'g, 83 App. Div. 2d 187,
444 N.Y.S.2d 331 (4th Dep't 1981).
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driver of the other vehicle. 219 A police officer who was present at

the scene of the accident detected the odor of alcohol emanating
from the defendant, and subsequently arrested him for driving
while intoxicated. 2 20 The defendant, after being read his preinter-

rogation rights, refused to consent to a blood test.221 The police
officer later directed a physician to withdraw a blood sample from
the defendant, which ultimately revealed a BAC of .23 of 1% by
weight.222 As a result of this finding, the defendant was indicted for
manslaughter in the second degree 223 and driving while intoxicated.224 The defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of criminally
negligent homicide225 in satisfaction of all counts against him,226
but the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the defendant's conviction, ordering suppression of the evidence relating
to the blood sample.227
219 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The defendant's vehicle
crossed over the center line into the opposite lane of traffic and struck the decedent's car
head on, killing him instantly. 83 App. Div. 2d at 187-88, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
220 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The defendant was also
arrested for failure to keep to the right-hand side of the road. Section 1193 of the Vehicle
and Traffic Law gives the police broad arrest authority in this area:
A police officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person, in case of a violation of
section eleven hundred ninety-two, [operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs] if such violation is coupled with an accident or collision in which such person is involved, which in fact has been committed, though
not in the police officer's presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by such person.
N.Y. VEH. & TRs. LAW § 1193 (McKinney 1970).
221 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. In both Moselle and
Daniel, there was no conscious refusal on the part of the defendants to submit to a blood
test. See id. at 102, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293; supra text accompanying note
205.
222 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The appellate division
stated that defendant's BAC was .21 of 1% by weight. 83 App. Div. 2d at 188, 444 N.Y.S.2d
at 332. Thus, there was a discrepancy between the BAC reported by the Court of Appeals
and that reported by the appellate division.
222 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294; see N.Y. PENAL LAW §
125.15 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
224 Id.; see N.Y. VEH. & TR.
LAw § 1192(3) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
225 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294; see N.Y. PENAL LAw §
125.10 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
226 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. The defendant also had
been charged with assault in the second degree. Id.; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05(4) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1982-1983).
221783 App. Div. 2d at 189-90, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333. The appellate division declared that
"[w]hile a warrantless taking of blood from a person under arrest ... is undoubtedly constitutional ... it is not permissible to utilize the results of such a blood test in a trial where
a statute [namely, Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1194(2)] plainly indicates it shall not be

taken if the subject refuses to consent .

. . ."

Id. at 189, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 333 (citations
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On appeal, the Court of Appels affirmed the orders of suppression in both cases,22 8 holding that the issuance of a court order
is a prerequisite to the nonconsensual extraction of a blood sample
during a prearrest investigation which culminates in a prosecution
230
under the Penal Law.229 Judge Jones, writing for the majority,
stated initially that the Court's decision was based upon statutory,
rather than constitutional, grounds.23 1 Indeed, the Court reasoned,
since both Daniel and Wolter involved prosecutions under the Penal Law," 2 section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law,23 which
deals with court-ordered discovery, is controlling as to the admissibility of the evidence derived from the blood tests. 234 The majority
omitted). Moreover, the court stated that the language of section 1194(2) forecloses the use
of blood test evidence in prosecutions under the Penal Law. Id: at 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 331;
see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1194(2) (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1981-1982).
2- 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
2 9 57 N.Y.2d at 101, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
230 Chief Judge Cooke, and Judges Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and Meyer joined in the majority opinion. Judge Jasen dissented, and Judge Gabrielli took no part in consideration of
the case.
31 57 N.Y.2d at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
282 Id. at 109-10, 439 N.E.2d at 1239-40, 454 N.YS.2d at 296-97; see supra text accompanying notes 215 & 225.
233 CPL § 240.40 (1982). Section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutional limitation, the court
in which an indictment, superior court information, prosecutor's information or
information is pending; (a) must order discovery as to any property not disclosed
upon demand pursuant to section 240.30, if it finds that the defendant's refusal to
disclose such material is not justified; and (b) may order the defendant to provide
non-testimonial evidence. Such order may, among other things, require the defendant to:
(v) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair or other materials from
his body in a manner not involving an unreasonable intrusion thereof or
a risk of serious physical injury thereto;
(vii) Submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body.
This subdivision shall not be construed to limit, expand, or otherwise affect
the issuance of a similar court order, as may be authorized by law, before the filing
of an accusatory instrument consistent with such rights as the defendant may derive from the constitution of this state or of the United Statds.
Id. § 240.40(2).
2- 57 N.Y.2d at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297-98. The Court stated that
section 240.40, although termed a discovery statute, was not designed to relate solely to
traditional discovery inside a pending action. Indeed, noted the Court, "[t]he explicit recognition [in the last sentence of subdivision two] ... confirms that the Legislature had within
its contemplation a broad all-inclusive scope of consideration." Id. at 110 n.4, 439 N.E.2d at
1240 n.4, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297 n.4; see supra note 233.
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observed that subdivision two of that section manifests the legislature's intention to preempt the field with respect to the taking of
blood samples, and provides that no such tests are authorized absent a court order. 35 The Court then remarked that apart from the
statute, its recent decision in In re Abe A.23 6 requires a court order
for any nonconsensual withdrawal of blood prior to the filing of an
accusatory

instrument against the defendant.2 3 7 Additionally,

Judge Jones summarily rejected the argument that an exception to
the court order requisite should be made in this instance due to
the existence of exigent circumstances. 8
In a dissent, Judge Jasen disagreed with the majority's construction of section 240.40, arguing that by its terms, it is a discovery statute, and thus only applies to instances when criminal proceedings are pending. 239 The dissent, unlike the majority, then
addressed the contention that a forced extraction of blood from a
motorist who is believed to be intoxicated is constitutionally prohibited.240 Judge Jasen asserted that no constitutional infringement occurred since there was exigency, given the "evanescent nature of the evidence sought," and since the standards set forth in
In re Abe A. to measure the constitutionality of a compelled ex235 57 N.Y.2d at 110, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297.
236 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982); see supra text accompanying
notes 204-05.
237 57 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. In Abe A., the Court of
Appeals held that a prearrest extraction of blood pursuant to a court order is constitutional
so long as there is probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime, as well as
a clear indication that relevant material evidence will be found, and a safe, reliable means of
obtaining the sample is utilized. 56 N.Y.2d at 291, 437 N.E.2d at 266, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 7. The
Abe A. panel also stated that a court should balance such factors as the seriousness of the
crime, the importance of the evidence to the investigation, and any alternative means of
gathering evidence, against the individual's right to be free from "bodily intrusion.'! Id. at
291, 299, 437 N.E.2d at 266, 271,'452 N.Y.S.2d at 7, 12.
228 57 N.Y.2d at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1239-40, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97. The Court rejected
the argument that the taking of a blood sample without a court order is permissible in cases
where exigent circumstances are present, stating that, "[w]hile the existence of exigent circumstances may excuse the failure to obtain a court order, their existence does not provide
a source of authority to conduct discovery." Id. It is submitted that this statement by the
Court effectively eliminates the utility of the doctrine of exigent circumstances by expanding the concept of discovery to include action taken before an accusatory instrument is
filed against the individual.
239 57 N.Y.2d at 111-12, 439 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Judge Jasen, in expressing his surprise that the majority relied upon the last paragraph of section 240.40(2) of the CPL, see supra notes 233-34, asserted that this section
never was meant to broaden discovery to the preaccusatory instrument stage. 57 N.Y.2d at
111-12, 439 N.E.2d at 1241-42, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
240 57 N.Y.2d at 112-13, 439 N.E.2d at 1242, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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traction of blood were satisfied. 4
It is suggested that an examination of the legislative history,4 2
as well as the language of section 240.04,243 demonstrates that that
section was not intended to apply to the taking of a blood sample
prior to the commencement of a criminal proceeding. The asserted
purpose of the provision was to "broaden criminal discovery, while
accommodating reasonable concerns of the prosecutors and defense counsel. 2 4 This legislative purpose,245 coupled with the language of the statute itself, which refers to court-ordered discovery
after an accusatory instrument has been filed,24 6 clearly contemplates that section 240.40 applies only after a penal proceeding has
been instituted against the defendant.2 47 Moreover, the existence
of citation to Schmerber in the legislative history of section 240.40
impliedly recognizes that the presence of exigency affects application of the statute.2 48 It is thus suggested that the court's recent
241

Id. at 113-14, 439 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (Jasen, J., dissenting);

see supra notes 201 & 237.
242 Section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law, dealing with court-ordered discovery
was a Governor's program bill, developed through consultation with various groups such as
the Office of Court Administration, the Judicial Conference, the State Bar Association, the
State District Attorney's Association, the Legal Aid Society, and the Senate and Assembly
Codes Committee. 57 N.Y.2d at 110, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.E.2d at 297. The measure
was adopted on July 5, 1979, and became effective on January 1, 1980. Act of July 5, 1979,
ch. 412, § 2, [1979] N.Y. Laws 928 (current version at CPL § 240.40 (1982)).
24 See CPL § 240.40(2) (1982); supra note 233. The statute was expressly intended to
apply in the context of an indictment, superior court information, prosecutor's information
pending action. CPL § 240.40(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
244 Letter from Frederick Miller to Honorable Richard A. Brown (June 26, 1979) (discussing proposed amendments to section 240.40) (emphasis added).
25 Most of the commentators on the proposed bill indicated that section 240.40 was
intended to apply only to those cases in which a criminal proceeding already was pending.
See, e.g., Letter from Patrick 0. Monserrate to Governor Hugh L. Carey (June 8, 1979)
(District Attorney's Association approves statute's effect on pretrial discovery); Letter from
Robert M. Schlanger to Honorable Richard Brown (June 27, 1979) (Division of Criminal
Justice Service's recommendation of approval for section 240 as an improvement "of the
prosecutorial phase of the criminal justice process"). In the memorandum of Senator Ronald
B. Stafford, it again was indicated that the statute was to apply solely in the context of
pending actions. Indeed, the memorandum states that the bill favored neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel in a criminal proceeding. These parties are not involved until a
criminal proceeding has begun, thus section 240.40 was intended to Apply in instances where
a criminal proceeding has begun. Memorandum of Sen. Stafford, reprinted in [1979] N.Y.
LEGIs. ANN. 250; see supra note 233.
246 CPL § 240.40(2) (1982); see supra note 233.
247 CPL § 240.40, commentary at 383 (1982). Professor Bellacosa, referring to the Moselle case, questions the applicability of the statute to "the acquisition of evidence in a precommencement of criminal proceeding context in any event." Id.
248 Memorandum of Office of Court Admissions, reprinted in [1979] N.Y. Laws 1889
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decisions in the area of nontestimonial evidence are rendered problematical by
the court's inconsistent application of the doctrine of
9
exigency.

24

Notwithstanding these statutory difficulties, it nevertheless is
proper, as the dissent observed, to address the constitutional issue
of whether a prearrest extraction of blood without a court order is
ever permissible. 250 It is clear that sound constitutional precedent

supports the proposition that the nonconsensual taking of a blood
sample without a court order during a prearrest investigation is
permissible when exigent circumstances exist.251 Practically speaking, a court order prerequisite under such circumstances seemingly
will prevent the prosecution of alcohol-related violations of the Pe(McKinney) (citing Schmerber in discussing proposed section 240.40). Mr. Frederick Miller,
the legislative counsel to the Office of Court Administration, noted that:
Under this section, a court may order discovery of material found to be improperly refused, and may, again subject to constitutional limitation, order the defendant to give nontestimonial evidence. He may be ordered to... give a blood,
voice, or handwriting sample ... or submit to a reasonable physical or medical
inspection. Under adequate court-imposed safeguards such orders will not violate
the defendant's constitutional rights. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
Letter from Frederick Miller to Honorable Richard A. Brown (June 26, 1979). The legislative history's citation of Schmerber, a case which recognizes that exigency excuses the failure to obtain a search warrant, see supra note 201, seemingly indicates the belief that the
exigency exception to the fourth amendment requirement of a search warrant may apply
notwithstanding the applicability of section 240.40. Such reasoning, it is suggested, weakens
the Moselle court's absolute view of the court order requisite of section 240.40.
2" In Abe A. the Court in urging that a prearrest blood sample may be taken pursuant
to court order, relied upon Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Abe A. 56 N.Y.2d at 295-97, 437 N.E.2d at 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 1011. It has been suggested that this reliance was misplaced since those cases, unlike Abe A.
involved the presence of exigency. See The Survey, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 805, 852-53
(1983). Because of the lack of exigency in Abe A. it has been contended that the Court
should have required institution of a penal proceeding, and thus, an application of section
240.40 allowing the production of the blood samples in a pending action. See The Survey,
supra, at 834; supra note 234 and accompanying text.
In Moselle, however, exigency was present. Therefore, it is submitted that the Court,
rather than applying section 240.40, should have relied on Schmerber and Cupp to permit
the nonconsensual extraction of blood samples.
250 57 N.Y.2d at 112-13, 439 N.E.2d at 1242, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
'" See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (evidence obtained by scraping
defendant's fingernails held admissible since defendant put his hands behind his back and
attempted to rub off the incriminating evidence); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-71 (1966) (blood sample taken without a court order in attempt to ascertain BAC held
not an unreasonable search and seizure, given the evanescent quality of alcohol in the
blood); People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417, 427, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1159, 426 N.Y.S.2d 253, 258
(1980) (evidence obtained without a search warrant by scraping defendant's fingernails held
admissible due to the high probability that the evidence would be destroyed if the police
waited to procure a warrant).
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nal Law.2 52 Indeed, imposition of such a requirement is particularly
inappropriate at a time when the number of alcohol-related traffic
23
accidents is increasing dramatically.
Robert J. Gunther, Jr.

No cause of action may be maintained by a nonpatient kidney
donor under the rescue doctrine
It is well established that one who is injured while attempting
to rescue another may recover from the tortfeasor whose original
negligence precipitated the need for the rescue.254 An independent
'12 See Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the Taking of Body Evidence, 78 YALE L.J.
1074, 1078 & n.37 (1979) (discussing the exigency involved in testing for BAC); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 1970) (prescribing a 2-hour time limit for the taking of
blood samples to determine BAC).
253 See supra note 203.
2 See generally Tiley, The Rescue Principle,30 MOD. L. REV. 25, 25 (1967); Note,
Torts: Proximate Cause: Rescue Doctrine, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 476, 476-81 (1950). A rescue is
considered to be a normal, intervening action which does not break the original chain of
causation, regardless of whether the actual rescue was foreseeable. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 276-77 (4th ed. 1971). Indeed, "[t]he right of one person to
render another assistance, when the latter is in danger from any cause, under conditions
rendering it safe to do so, is as clear as his right to perform any other lawful act." Bond v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 82 W. Va. 557, 561, 96 S.E. 932, 934 (1918); cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 294 comment a (1965) (one who creates "an unreasonable risk of harm" to a
person may be liable to that person's rescuer).
The first New York case considering the rescue doctrine was Eckert v. Long Island
R.R., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871), in which the Court of Appeals stated that negligence will not be
imputed to one who attempts to preserve human life, "unless [his act was done] under such
circumstances as to constitute rashness...... Id. at 506. In a similar vein, Judge Cardozo,
in the oft-quoted language of Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437
(1921), observed:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law
does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences.
It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural
and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is
a wrong also to his rescuer ....
The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is
born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not
have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.
Id. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437-38 (citation omitted).
The rescue doctrine has been recognized in virtually all jurisdictions. See, e.g., Barger
v. Charles Mach. Works, Inc., 658 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1981); Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 6 Cal. 3d 361, 368, 491 P.2d 821, 824-25, 99 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-33 (1971); Walker Hauling
Co. v. Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 620, 624, 139 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1964); Seibutis v. Smith, 83 InI.
App. 3d 1010, 1015-16, 404 N.E.2d 950, 954 (1980); Brock v. Peabody Coop. Equity Exch.,
186 Kan. 657, 659-60, 352 P.2d 37, 40 (1960); Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 450, 70 N.W.2d
805, 808 (1955); McConnell v. Pic-Walsh Freight Co., 432 S.W.2d 292, 299-300 (Mo. 1968);

